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Abstract
This research attempted to capture the creative aspects of government program
management in three specific areas: efficiently navigating oversight, capturing the intent of
regulations, and developing innovative risk management practices. Respected acquisition
leaders with diverse backgrounds and experiences were interviewed with ranks ranging from
0-6 to 0-8 and GS-15 to SES. Several contractor interviews were conducted for specific
purposes. The data were iteratively coded and analyzed using ATLAS.ti. The results were
categorized into four themes, each with three sub-elements. Differences between
respondents with program director experience and those with rapid acquisition experience
are discussed. A survey was then distributed to the interviewees and junior acquisition
professionals. The predominant research finding is that senior acquisition professionals
believe that relationship-building is of paramount importance. This, along with creative
practices regarding how to externally communicate program strategies, greatly increases the
probability of successfully navigating oversight and obtaining waivers or tailoring regulations.
Various risk management techniques and management reserve techniques are presented. In
addition, knowledge gaps between the junior acquisition workforce and senior leaders were
identified based on statistical significance and corrective actions recommended where
applicable. Reports and outbriefs were developed, tailored to each class, to relay these
creative practices to junior acquisition professionals.

Introduction
This paper presents the results of exploratory thesis research regarding creative
program management practices as identified by senior leaders. For the purposes of this
paper, creative is defined as any innovative, resourceful, uncommon, or out-of-the-box
thinking and practices leading to efficient and effective program management without
jeopardizing integrity, ethics, or laws. The literature review identified three areas of
investigation:
Topic 1: How to creatively reduce non value-added oversight
Topic 2: How to creatively capture the intent of regulations
Topic 3: Creative practices of resource-loaded risk management
The first two topics are the focus of this paper because they led to the overarching
findings. Interviews with respected, leading practitioners representing diverse programs with
1
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varying sizes and complexity were conducted. A survey was then distributed to government
acquisitions personnel, further validating interview findings with quantitative data, as well as
prioritizing responses from senior leaders and identifying the major differences in the junior
workforce.
Literature Review
Perhaps the greatest impediment to the achievement of high quality—and
productivity—is … burgeoning bureaucracy.
(Augustine, 1997, p. 79)
The type of oversight described in this paper must be defined because “oversight”
can have various meanings based on the reader’s experiences. For the purposes of this
research, oversight consists of the organizations and people needed to approve (either
formally or informally) a program’s approach and/or documentation to proceed to the next
phase in the acquisition life cycle. This is separate from government oversight of
contractors or prime contractor oversight of subcontractors. This research is not meant to
make judgments as to the goodness of oversight or to assess the theory of checks and
balances versus optimal efficiency. The goal is to identify creative ways in which DoD
acquisition oversight can be made more beneficial or, in situations when oversight is overly
cumbersome, how it can be effectively navigated with minimal effort.
Setting the Stage: Extensive Oversight—A Serious Issue
Acquisition oversight began in the 1960s (Acker, 1993). Numerous studies and
reports on defense acquisition have subsequently been conducted over the past five
decades. A common theme extracted from these reports is that a serious problem exists
with extensive, non-required, and, many times, non value-added oversight. One panel of
experts estimated the cost of oversight in Air Force programs to be as high as $94 million
(Neal, 2004). Knue’s (1991) thesis is recommended as a detailed source for explaining
oversight of and within the DoD. Additionally, several case studies exist on oversight within
Air Force programs. A few of the more prominent reports are summarized in the following
paragraphs.
Miller and Williams (1993) conducted a case study of oversight in the C-17 program.
The interviews they conducted revealed that oversight had a negative effect on program
management and morale. There was “absolute certainty in the collective consciousness” of
members of the C-17 program office that a link exists between oversight and its effect on
cost and schedule performance (Knue, 1991, p. 72). Interviewees also cited external
(outside the chain of command) sources of oversight from nine distinct organizations that
negatively affected the program. These nine external sources did not include legislative,
executive, and media oversight (Miller & Williams, 1993).
A RAND study of the B-1B bomber program concluded that an extraordinary amount
of internal and external coordination was required, leading to a “ceaseless series of
meetings, calls, and memos” (Bodilly, 1993, p. 40). The study concluded that 14 different
groups had major roles in the program.
The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase 2 Report (Murdock et al., 2005) stated that
the “well-intentioned majority of the acquisition corps today faces two significant types of
bureaucratic impediments: highly centralized oversight and conflicting guidance” (p. 91).
The Phase 2 Report also found that program managers (PMs) and program executive
officers (PEOs) are left with about 50% or less of their time to actually manage their
programs (Murdock et al., 2005).
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The highly regarded Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) report in
2006 showed that 97% of the survey inputs received indicated that the current oversight and
leadership process is deficient (Kadish et al., 2006). Figure 1, from the DAPA report,
highlights the key issues affecting government acquisitions. As can be seen in the figure,
respondents viewed oversight as the most prevalent issue.

Integrated Look at Key Issues
(Kadish et al., 2006)
Oversight is discussed in several sections of the DAPA report. Figure 2 is a onepage summary of the myriad DAPA findings with respect to oversight. Issues relating to
oversight are divided into four categories: Extent of Oversight, Programmatic Issues,
Accountability/Authority Issues, and Effect on Progress.
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Extent of oversight
-

Current oversight process is burdensome, ineffective, adds little value, and inhibits
steady improvement
Excessive numbers of reviews and oversight personnel; quantity replaced quality

-

Regulations written to implement policy are more stringent than the policy itself

-

Dissatisfaction with sheer volume of acquisition JawsJ regulations, and policies

-

Rely on overlapping layers of reviews at the expense of focus and quality

Programmatic Issues
Acquisition Category (ACAT) designation process results in excessive number of
programs requiring additional level of DAB approvalsJ causing excessive reporting
requirements
-

Even with the laborious and extensive oversight, troubled programs still pass through
Lack of continuity or attendance on OSD acquisition IPTs results in the re-emergence of
issues previously resolved and revisiting decisions

-

Policy and guidance often conflict, resulting in ignoring policy or seeking legal advice

-

Institutional biases t oward waiving or tailoring regulations (even though DoD Directives
promote tailoring for each program's situation)

Accountability/Authority Issues
Oversight is preferred to accountability and based on a lack of trust
-

Oversight dilutes or eliminates accountability for program performance

-

PMseffectiveness is constrained by people who do not share responsibility or
accountability
OSD staff do not have decision-making authority or timely access to principal decision
makers
None of the review bodies are accountable for the impact of the changes they imposed

Progress Suffers
-

Staffs allowed to assume de-facto pro,gram authority, stop progress and increase
program scope
Programs advance in spite of the oversight process rather than because of it

-

PM does not have authority to bypass a stakeholders "no" vote, programs progress held
hostage

Figure 2.

Summary of DAPA Report Findings on Oversight
(extracted from Kadish et al., 2006)

Lastly, Ford, Colburn, and Morris (2012) found that large programs and budgets,
such as acquisition category (ACAT) 1 multi-year programs, are easy targets for increased
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oversight and longer approval chains. They showed a positive correlation between program
size (measured by budget dollars) and the extent of oversight.
Factors Affecting the Level of Oversight
A factor affecting one’s ability to manage oversight and stakeholders is political skill.
Political skills include developing coalitions and gaining resources, assistance, and
approvals from senior leaders and other relevant parties (Yukl, 2006). Additionally, De Wit
(1988, p. 167) stated, “political skill will be a useful attribute on the part of the project
manager to assure maximum satisfaction among the stakeholders. This is of special
importance on public-sector projects.” Furthermore, Yukl (2006) discusses five skills
required for leading cross-functional teams (which includes integrated product teams [IPTs]).
Specifically, political and interpersonal skills are associated with managing oversight and
leading IPTs (Yukl, 2006). These skills involve understanding the needs and values of
stakeholders to influence them and resolve conflict. In addition, a higher program
classification can reduce oversight because it limits the number of people to those with the
requisite security classification and need to know (Ford, Colburn, & Morris, 2012).
Finally, the literature on DoD acquisitions points to four main areas that affect
oversight (Pagliano & O’Rourke, 2004; Kadish et al, 2006). The first factor affecting
oversight is uncertainty. If all else is constant, the greater the program uncertainty, the more
extensive the oversight will be. Second, oversight will increase as program criticality
increases. In other words, if a program is critical to national security, a high degree of
oversight will exist. Third, oversight will increase as trust decreases. If the chain of
command and external stakeholders do not have a high degree of trust in what the program
office is doing, more external reviews and proof will be required from the program office,
thus leading to more extensive oversight. Finally, oversight will increase as the level of
control and standardization from leaders increases. A model was developed (Figure 3) from
the review showing how various factors affect the level of oversight in a program.

Factors Affecting Level of Oversight
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Methodology
Research Design
Theoretical Method
This research utilized Grounded Theory Methods (GTM). Auerbach and Silverstein
(2003) suggest GTM when a researcher’s particular theory is at its early stage, not enough
is known to state hypotheses prior to the investigation, and the major research involves
identifying and categorizing elements to explore their connections. One of the key tenets of
GTM is the iterative process of collecting, coding, and interpreting the data, also known as
analytic induction (Binder & Edwards, 2010). As such, the interview process and data
analysis were iterative in nature.
Sample Size
For the interview sample size, Eisenhardt (1989) states that 4–10 cases have
worked well for most qualitative studies. Separate research conducted by Ellram (1996)
identifies 6–10 cases as sufficiently large for evaluation and empirical grounding. Therefore,
one-on-one interviews were conducted with 10 hand-picked senior acquisition leaders with
diverse backgrounds and program experience.
Sampling Strategy
Eisenhardt (1989, p. 537) states that “random [case] selection is neither necessary,
nor preferable” when building theory from case studies. Both purposive and snowball
sampling were used in this research. Purposive sampling is used in qualitative research
where individuals are selected based on their ability to better inform the researcher
(Krathwohl, 1998; Patten, 2009). Snowball sampling entails identifying future participants
based on recommendations from past participants (Krathwohl, 1998). In other words, the
interviewees specifically suggest other people to interview. Snowball sampling successfully
led to three interviews.
Personal Interviews
The population for this research consisted of Air Force program managers (PMs)
with at least 20 years of experience. This included active duty and retired officers with ranks
ranging from colonel to major general, active duty civilians with ranks ranging from GS-15 to
Senior Executive Service (SES), and three government contractors. Both Air Force product
centers, the Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC) and Space and Missile Systems
Center (SMC), were represented, along with Special Operations Command (SOCOM).
Programs covered included Global Positioning System (GPS), SOCOM Fixed Wing,
Spacelift Range, Big Safari, F-22, Project Dragon Spear, Military Satellite Communications
Directorate (MILSATCOM), FalconSAT, and the Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition
(SAF/AQ) and Aerospace organizations.
Coding: Atlas.ti
The ExpressScribe program was used to quickly transfer the interviews into
Microsoft Word documents. The interviews were then coded, categorized, and analyzed in
ATLAS.ti, a software program specifically designed for qualitative research, using an “open
coding” of labels to extract major themes. All responses were analyzed for common
themes. Three rounds of analysis were conducted in ATLAS.ti.
Survey
Additionally, a survey was developed from the interview data and distributed to the
interviewees as well as junior officers and civilians in the introductory Fundamentals of
Acquisition Management (FAM) 103 and mid-level Intermediate Program Management
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(IPM) 301 skills courses. The survey contained 65 questions on a 1–5 Likert scale with an
additional column for respondents to mark “unknown.” Two classes from each course were
surveyed. Fifty-eight students in the FAM 103 courses and 35 students in the IPM 301
courses provided usable surveys, totaling 93. The survey served three purposes:
1. Quantitatively validate interview responses with statistical significance
2. Prioritize themes from senior leaders
3. Identify knowledge gaps in the junior workforce
According to Cohen (1992), for an alpha (α) level of 0.05 (a 95% confidence level)
and a medium effect size, one must have a sample size of at least 85. For a large effect
size at the same confidence level, the sample size should be at least 28. Therefore, a
conservative sample size of at least 85 was the goal; 93 usable student surveys were
completed along with the additional 10 from the senior leaders.
Limitations/Assumptions
The nature of qualitative data and grounded theory research allows for interpretation
depending on the researcher’s point of view. Qualitative analysis “can therefore become
biased based on individual experience and perspective” (Ford et al., 2012). The author
endeavored to be cognizant of bias and avoid it when guiding interview discussions and
interpreting, coding, and analyzing the data.
The results will have a high degree of reliability for all DoD program managers, even
though the population set was limited to Air Force program managers. Studies have shown
that all the Services are comparable with respect to their acquisition processes and record
of success (Kadish et al., 2006; Burton, 1993).
Analysis and Results
Interview Analysis
From three iterative rounds of coding the data, four themes and 12 sub-elements
emerged as shown in Figure 4.
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ATLAS.ti Round 3 Results
A co-occurrence table was developed analyzing where common occurrences within
and between themes and codes occurred. The strength of a co-occurrence is affected by
the number of times a comment was made either during a single interview or between
several interviews. Strong and medium co-occurrences are collected and displayed in Table
1, with the three key findings for this paper highlighted.
Strong and Medium Co-Occurrences Between Sub-Elements

Strong Co‐occurrences
Break down barriers & build relationships
Break down barriers & build relationships

strongly co‐occurs with
strongly co‐occurs with

External communications strategy
Navigating oversight

Medium Co‐occurrences
Break down barriers & build relationships
Break down barriers & build relationships
External communications strategy
External communications strategy
External communications strategy
Efficiencies/time savers
Enterprise risks
Working risks

co‐occurs with
co‐occurs with
co‐occurs with
co‐occurs with
co‐occurs with
co‐occurs with
co‐occurs with
co‐occurs with

Contractor relationships
Seeking waivers/tailoring regulations
Efficiencies/time savers
Seeking waivers/tailoring regulations
Navigating oversight
Navigating oversight
Working risks
Management reserve principles

The interviews were also categorized based on the respondents with experience as
a program director (PD) and those with experience in rapid acquisitions. Five interviews
were coded as those with PD experience and three interviews were coded as those with
rapid acquisition experience. Figure 5 graphically displays the focus areas between the two
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groups. Interestingly, the top three responses were the same for both groups. These were
the External Communications Strategy, Break Down Barriers and Build Relationships, and
Navigating Oversight. The main focus area for the program directors regarded their external
communications strategies, which is understandable given the amount of oversight and
number of stakeholders present in MDAP programs. A great deal of time is spent ensuring
goals and strategies are being communicated clearly, accurately, and in a timely manner
across organizational boundaries. Navigating Oversight was the second focus area for both
program directors and those with rapid acquisition experience. However, a key difference
exists between the two groups. Program directors’ practices relating to oversight involved
how to efficiently and effectively work through the current oversight and regulations. The
oversight was viewed more as a fact of life that had to be worked through. In contrast, rapid
acquisition responses focused more on how to circumvent the oversight from the start. In
other words, rather than trying to efficiently work through oversight, rapid acquisition
organizations delegate approvals and obtain waivers from the beginning (the thesis contains
a case study on how USSOCOM instantly tailors 5000.02 via SOCOM Directive 70-1).
Accepting the oversight level and figuring out how best to navigate it is very different than
navigating oversight by avoiding the oversight from the beginning.

Histogram Comparing PD and Rapid Experience Responses
Additionally, a significant difference also existed between the PD and rapid
experience responses for Seeking Waivers/Tailoring Regulations. Rapid acquisition
organizations spend a lot of effort on tailoring programs and obtaining waivers. However,
program directors often viewed the process of obtaining a waiver as more difficult than
actually complying with the guidance, even if it did not make sense for the program.
Therefore, program tailoring was a larger focus area for those with rapid acquisition
experience. Figure 6 provides a decision-making process to obtain a waiver/tailoring based
on the interviews in the “Seeking Waivers/Tailoring Regulations” sub-element.
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Decision-Making Process to Obtain a Waiver/Tailoring
Survey Analysis
Table 2 shows the overall survey data results divided into junior-level and seniorlevel responses. Of particular note for the results discussion is the percentage of “unknown”
responses from students in each sub-element, some of which were unexpected.
Overall Survey Results

An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted for each sub-element. Both Break
Down Barriers and Build Relationships and Navigating Oversight showed ANOVA
significance at the 98% confidence level. Normality is required from both groups for a valid
ANOVA test. Normality can be assumed for the students’ responses because a random
sample of 93 data points was collected and used (normality requires at least 30 data points
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collected at random from the population; McClave, Benson, & Sincich, 2010). However,
because only 10 data points were used for the senior leaders group, a Shapiro-Wilk test of
normality was conducted on the three sub-elements with significant results. Navigating
Oversight showed normality by having a Shapiro-Wilk value greater than 0.05. Initially,
normality was not shown for the Break Down Barriers and Build Relationships sub-element,
but after investigation one survey response was removed with high confidence that the
respondent accidentally reverse coded one of the questions (answered 1 instead of 5 on the
Likert scale) based on their interview remarks. After this was done, this sub-element passed
the Shapiro-Wilk test, showing normality as well.
Overview of Theme and Sub-Element Results
The three key sub-elements were pulled from the results and are presented next.
Figures 7–9 give an overall assessment for each sub-element. The overall assessment
consists of two parts. A qualitative assessment rating of 1 to 5 is given based on the
interviews and ATLAS.ti analysis (consistency and quantity of quotes, importance placed on
quotes, number of co-occurrences, strength of co-occurrences, and other subjective
measures). Additionally, quantitative top-level survey results are provided. The average
response is on a 1 to 5 Likert scale from the survey, and the percent unknown is the percent
of respondents that marked unknown for questions relating to each particular sub-element.
Lastly, a “Yes” or “No” is given if the ANOVA test between the Junior and Senior responses
for that sub-element was significant.
Theme 1 Sub-Element 1: Break Down Barriers and Build Relationships
Qualitative Assessment: 5
Survey Results:
Junior:

Senior:

Avg response:

3.75

4.40

% Unknown:

7.3%

N/A

ANOVA Significant?

Yes

Overall Assessment for Theme 1 Sub-Element 1


Building personal, trusting relationships requires consistency and stability



Importance of following through on your word



Importance of networking plus solid rationale



Returning un-executable money builds trust in large programs

Building relationships and trust was the most commonly vocalized point throughout
the interviews when discussing how best to navigate oversight or obtain a waiver or
tailoring. Building and maintaining strong, trusting relationships with peers, co-workers,
superiors, stakeholders, and various members of oversight is a continual process built over
time. Trust is increased when project members follow through on their word. Although
intuitive, the importance of doing what you say you will do, when you said you would do it,
should not be undervalued.
Personal relationships with a high degree of trust require consistency and stability,
which is often lacking in major acquisition programs. Air Force military PM tenure is typically
a three-year tour for the actual materiel leader billet. Below the PM level, military acquisition
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officers and engineers are usually in a program for two years and then do a permanent
change of assignment (PCA) in which they switch jobs, which can be within the same
program office or not. Even if military members prefer to stay in their assignments, it may
not be good for their career to do so. The two years does not include any training,
continuous learning, deployments, or additional duties the member might need to complete.
One PM the author previously worked with stated the turnover issue clearly. Simply put,
they lost half their people every summer, and that was a best case scenario. Worst case,
they had a complete turnover one year in which no military continuity existed in a major
ACAT I program. Stability and consistency, and the resultant trust and relationships, are
constricted by the acquisition assignments process. Alternatively, organizations with a rich
history and culture, such as Big Safari, with only three or four directors in the past 60 years,
allow for close, personal relationships to be cultivated over time.
Networking is extremely vital to get one’s issue “brought to the table.” As one
respondent mentioned, “I would have never been promoted once in my life if it wasn’t about
relationships …. I built relationships, I knew what people wanted, I knew the people to rely
on, I did the extra thing, so relationship-building in that oversight process is instrumental.”
Networking builds trust by building closer relationships. This in turn increases the likelihood
for a program approval, waiver, or tailoring. However, some negative aspects of networking
were cited in the interviews as well. When one becomes more senior and is on their second
or third tour at the same base, the people who have previously known them may still view
them as their company grade officer (CGO) friend and not show the requisite respect.
Additionally, past co-workers may not be as concerned about deadlines because they have
a personal relationship with the senior. Last, the ease of recognizing “phony networking”
was cited in a couple interviews, which is when one realizes someone is building a
relationship solely for their own benefit. Although drawbacks to networking exist, the
positive aspects far outweigh the drawbacks.
Building relationships is enabled by knowing what you are doing. Even if all the
previous statements were true, if the rationale for what you are trying to do is flimsy, trust
and networking will be far less effective. Having solid rationale in your decision-making is a
key enabler to building trust because others may not want to enable members of their own
network to assist in doing something that does not make sense if it will result in a lower trust
level for them. As one respondent discussed, “Having a sense of purpose, knowing what
you’re trying to do, and having strong rationale communicates a message much better.”
Lastly, returning un-executable money builds trust in large programs, if they are
behind schedule and must do so. The money must be returned through the PEO, not
directly to Air Force or other channels. Returning un-executable money does not include
“expired” funds.
In this sub-element, the responses between the students and senior leaders were
significantly different. The mean of the senior responses was 4.40 compared to a mean of
3.75 for students. As was briefed to each FAM and IPM class, the senior leaders
emphasized and put much more value on relationship-building, building trust, and
networking than did the students. The takeaway for the students is that as they are starting
out or continuing their careers, they should begin building relationships with folks in required
trainings, other programs, outside of work, etc., to expand their network. Of course, this
cannot be done from a selfish or “further myself” point of view, but rather should be
genuinely for the benefit of all.
In summary, as one respondent discussed, “What do I do to navigate [oversight]? I
try to break down those barriers as much as possible. I really try to build relationships with
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people, so that they know if something is really bugging them they can give me a call so we
can talk back and forth.”

Theme 1 Sub-Element 2: External Communications Strategy
Qualitative Assessment: 5
Survey Results:
Junior:

Senior:

Avg response:

4.09

4.5

% Unknown:

1.9%

N/A

ANOVA Significant?

No

Overall Assessment for Theme 1 Sub-Element 2



“Walking the building” every time



Benefits of physical communications



“Ground swell” or “burning your boots”



Value of an elevator speech



Knowing and communicating the “views of others”



Ability to communicate across paradigms

Once a decision is made as to the strategy on an issue, how the PM externally
communicates and “sells” what they’re doing is very important. Several interviewees
provided approaches they take. These include “walking the building” each time the PM is at
the Pentagon, physical communications, and “ground swell” or “burning your boots”
(proactive staff communication and dissemination of program strategies). Also, the value of
an elevator speech, knowing the “views of others,” and the ability to communicate across
paradigms all go a long way toward effectively communicating what the program is trying to
accomplish. Additionally, this sub-element had over a 2:1 ratio of responses from program
directors versus respondents with rapid experience. In general, those with PD experience
put much more emphasis into the importance and value of communicating what they are
doing. The likely reason for this is because large ACAT I programs experience much more
oversight (due to the multi-year, high-dollar value, and industry and congressional
stakeholders) than smaller, more rapid programs. However, in ACAT I programs, decisionmaking and oversight require more stakeholder analysis and often consist of a “one-shot”
opportunity to obtain program approvals, thus leading to the higher importance of the
program’s external communications strategy from program directors.
Several respondents mentioned how they “walk the building” when they are visiting
Washington, DC. This term is used to describe how a PM should visit key stakeholders,
members of oversight, and members of their network when walking around the Pentagon.
In particular, they should do this each time they are there, especially when nothing is
needed from the people they are visiting. Visiting offices and asking folks if they need
anything from you helps build trust and, with noble intent all along, can enable reciprocal
generosity when you need something from them. In other words, a genuine, proactive offer
to help others without any expectation for them to reciprocate in the future is an effective
communication strategy to build long-term relationships.
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Additionally, physical communications are far better than electronic means. Physical
communications enable one to match a face with a name, increase the importance of the
issue (if one flies to discuss an issue rather than e-mailing or calling, they are putting higher
importance on the issue), and make it more difficult to ignore the issue. Ignoring an e-mail
is fairly easy and ignoring a phone call is not much harder. However, when someone
physically visits you to discuss an issue, and then comes back to discuss the results, it is far
more difficult to ignore that person’s requests.
Another way to externally communicate a strategy is by “ground swell” or “burning
your boots.” This refers to the program staff, predominantly the Program Element Monitor
(PEM), proactively communicating and disseminating the strategy and goals throughout the
myriad program stakeholders in Washington, DC. This is done by working the staffing and
issues from the ground up, communicating to all stakeholders and staffs first so that there
are no surprises and so that any possible issues are brought to light early on. As one
respondent mentioned, “really good action officer work can save hours upon hours of
wasted time in meetings.”
Business, organizational behavior, and management books often discuss the
importance of an elevator speech (albeit using different terms). The premise is that if you
were to find yourself riding in an elevator with a senior manager, you should always have a
short (~1–2 minute) speech or talking points in mind to gain the senior manager’s support in
the time it takes to ride in the elevator. Interviewees discussed the importance of this
concept in acquisitions as well, with some discussing the value of a hard-hitting one-liner.
PMs need to have a short, direct, and effective means to communicate the program
capability and its vital importance without going into highly technical or programmatic details.
As one respondent said, “When I was having a problem getting funding for xx program, I
met with a key staffer. I said to him ‘Do you want our enemies to be able to launch a nuke
at us and we’re not able to detect it early enough to destroy it?”’ ‘Well, no.’ ‘This program
ensures early warning to protect the homeland. Period.’” These statements should be clear
and concise to the maximum extent possible. An excellent one-liner can be crucial for three
reasons:
1. if one unexpectedly has a moment of the senior’s time;
2. to translate a technical program into a tangible, national security issue; and
3. in helping the oversight help the program.
Staff Summary Sheets (SSS) have a section in which the “views of others” can be
documented. The purpose is to provide any differing views amongst various stakeholders,
specifically influential stakeholders, when staffing a package. Bringing contentious
viewpoints to the table early in the process has several benefits. It allows you to
1. take the time to grasp the heart of an issue and what you want to transmit,
2. clearly articulate your position, and
3. clearly articulate the views of others.
Once this is done, the package gets sent up the chain. The structure of an SSS
allows for clear communications on paper rather than dealing with the myriad information, or
often mis-information (as one respondent discussed), that goes through e-mail. Additionally,
“if you don’t accept or work those views of others from the get go, by the time you end up
briefing your leadership, and then your leadership’s leadership, you end up entrenched in a
position and you end up entrenched so much that it’s hard to walk backwards from anymore.
So it removes your flexibility from a compromise or otherwise.” Although it often works out
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in the end, it can be quite painful to go back several layers in the staffing process and the
resultant coordination change when a relatively small or easy change could have been
accomplished, provided it was worked up front.
When discussing how best to communicate or “sell” an issue, it is very important to
communicate across paradigms. Providing information in a way that program managers,
users, budgeters, engineers, and senior leaders in oversight all understand will help prevent
confusion and delays, particularly in the staffing process. Similar to knowing your audience
when giving a briefing, generally it is beneficial for a PM to know the audience for each
particular briefing, meeting, and document and tailor the product to the audience. A briefing
inundated with technical jargon and specifications is probably not best when providing
program status to the user or a senior leader.

Theme 2 Sub-Element 3: Navigating Oversight
Qualitative Assessment: 5
Survey Results:
Junior:

Senior:

3.55

4.06

19.5%

N/A

Avg response:
% Unknown:
ANOVA Significant?

Yes

Overall Assessment for Theme 2 Sub-Element 3



Pick and choose battles while preventing “blood in the water”



Acquisition oversight lacks government PM experience



Reduce oversight by executing the plan



Smartly defend program budgets

This sub-element discusses creative practices in working with oversight. Current
oversight also has several shortcomings. To be expected, senior leaders had a significant
difference in responses to the importance of navigating oversight than did students. Seniors
placed more emphasis on how to creatively navigate oversight, especially the subset of
senior leaders with program director experience.
First, acquisition experience is lacking in acquisition oversight positions. Political
appointees often come from industry, but as one respondent commented, “I’ve been to all
the schools you’re supposed to, and they always talk about how industry does things.
Industry and government are simply very different, and the same approaches will not work
for both.” Respondents also noted that the inexperience results in a lack of urgency.
Techniques to work with inexperienced oversight include clearly making your case for what
you are doing and laying out when a decision must be made (and the rationale and
outcomes if a decision is not made by then). If this does not work, allies either up the chain
or in other oversight positions must be gained to defend and promote your position. An
operations advocate at the MAJCOM or HQ level was cited as an extremely
beneficial/influential ally. Operations advocates will defend the program’s requirements,
criticality, and need as the user, rather than the program office defending its own jobs.
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Also, one way to reduce program oversight is to reduce the ACAT level of the
program whenever possible. For example, ten $100 million programs have much fewer
reporting requirements than one $1 billion program. This will allow each program to be
smaller and leaner, and have less oversight (all else held equal). One ACAT 1D program
noted how the documentation requirements for a milestone review have become
debilitating—96 documents containing 12,000+ pages. As the literature review showed,
increasing a program’s classification level reduces oversight as well. However, both a
program’s classification and ACAT level are determined by either law (for the ACAT level) or
strict policies (classification level); therefore, a PM has little authority to change these after
program conception.
When navigating oversight, PMs must pick and choose their battles on the few
issues on which they are not willing to compromise. This will reinforce to the community
what is not negotiable from the PM’s point of view. Correlated to this, one must prevent
“blood in the water” during decision reviews. This refers to a stakeholder or staff member
attacking controversial issues of the program during a meeting. The PM must directly and
convincingly quell these arguments so that other stakeholders do not latch on, much like
sharks when there’s blood in the water. For example, if a stakeholder questions the
reasoning for the contract type in the acquisition strategy, the PM should then and there
explain why it is the best contract type and incentive structure for the program. A hesitant
answer or having to get back to the stakeholder later allows for other stakeholders to look
into the issue and lose confidence in the PM having the requisite control and understanding
of the program. Of course, this needs to be tempered with difficult, unforeseen questions
that do not have a known answer. In these (hopefully rare) cases, a PM should promise to
get back to the person as quickly as possible. In summary, keeping the “blood out of the
water” can be immensely beneficial.
Practices in which programs defend their budgets (with integrity) reduce program
oversight as well. The best way to defend against budget cuts and reduce intervention is
simply to stay green—obligate and expend money on time. Second, programs should make
every effort to fund disconnects internally, as no one ever wants to ask for more money (nor
is it currently available). The 19.5% unknown responses from students in this sub-element
arise predominantly from this survey question. Surprisingly, 40% of students did not know if
programs should fund disconnects internally to the maximum extent possible. Therefore, it
is recommended that the appropriate continuing education course expand the teaching on
how PMs can avoid program interference by smartly managing funds internally. Although
this is of particular value to program directors, PMs at all levels can still learn from this
heuristic and do what they can to manage funds allowing for some degree of flexibility.
Third, perceptions are worse than reality in many areas of government acquisitions. If a
program is perceived to be fat (over-funded) or behind schedule, whether it is true or not,
the program is a more apt candidate for cuts.
Also, when hiring a material leader, some programs may find it highly beneficial to
hire one with recent PEM experience. For example, a pre-Milestone B program (even
though it is not technically called a program yet) will experience numerous decision reviews,
staffing, and oversight during the Milestone B and source selection processes. Recent PEM
experience greatly increases the process familiarity and likelihood that recent relationships
will prove useful in working the system.
Conclusions
In review, the predominant finding of this research is that senior acquisition
professionals believe that relationships and building trust are of paramount importance. A
high correlation exists between three main sub-elements: Break Down Barriers and Build
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Relationships, External Communications Strategy, and Navigating Oversight. The first two
are vital to effectively and efficiently navigating oversight. Both program directors and
respondents with rapid experience chose these three sub-elements as their top three
responses.
For Navigating Oversight, program directors more often accepted the level of
oversight as a fact of life, so they work hard to efficiently work with and through the oversight
for program success. However, rapid acquisition organizations navigated the oversight
process by delegating approval authorities and tailoring programs from the start, thus
avoiding a degree of oversight from the beginning.
Additionally, junior personnel did not believe the relationships nor the oversight
aspects to be as important as the senior leaders judged. Therefore, an opportunity exists
for DAU or AFIT classes to bolster the material relating to these topics. This is especially
important not only because the senior leaders attribute success to these areas, but because
relationships can be built over a career and the process of building relationships can begin
at the start of one’s acquisition journey.
Recommendations for Future Research
The following are recommendations for future research. Future research can be
accomplished to investigate the root cause of the significant differences shown between
introductory, mid-level, and senior acquisition professionals, both for differences in the Likert
scale responses and for questions with a significant number of “unknown” responses.
Additionally, the same thesis methodology could be applied to industry program managers
to assess the external validity of this research to industry.
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